

British to Follow Kitchener's Plan For Finishing the Blow

Germany Has Only 3,114,000 Bayonets

First Full Story of the Size and Composition of Kaiser's Army Now in Field Reveals How England's Apparent Inactivity Hides Dead Organizer's Scheme to Overwhelm Weakening Foes in 1917 or 1918 With Army Held Back as Allies' General Reserve.

FRANCE IS BEARING THE BRUNT NOW

Complete Data Shows How Teutons Have Used Up Last Reserves Except 30,000 Boys Who Ripen Monthly for Slaughter, While British Empire, With Army Now Almost as Big as Its Chief Enemy's Host of Six Millions, Waits; Delay Not Shirking, but Higher Strategy.

(By JOHN L. BALDERSTON)

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LONDON, June 14.—This is an accurate and detailed statement of the strength and composition of the German army at present and of how it has been built up during the war. To put the German army in proper perspective with the war as a whole, as much as permissible will be said concerning the forces on the allied side and the relative importance of numbers compared with munitions and finances just touched upon.

There is a wide gulf between the viewpoints of the soldier and the civilian toward battle. The result of an action is calculated by the soldier from the number of shells fired and casualties inflicted, relative to the number of men and projectiles possessed by the two sides. The civilian measures success by ground gained and prisoners taken. True, if any army gains much ground it almost always makes big hauls of prisoners and wins from any point of view, but it is the losses and not the ground that really count in this war of attrition.

This article is written from the soldier's point of view, from material supplied by staff officers who display no more bias for their own side in working out their calculations than if they were solving an equation, as indeed in a sense they are. "But if you write this sort of thing," correspondents as well as soldiers have said to me, "you will bore your readers stiff."

I am no cynic, and work on the assumption that the public, at least the American public, wants to know the truth about the war, not merely to read interesting and amusing official and unofficial half-truths and fairy tales. It is impossible in the stress of a great campaign for newspapers, or even generals, to learn the relative casualties and shell expenditure, while progress upon the map cannot be concealed, but the fundamental problem of man power, studied for two years by all the staffs in Europe, can be accurately stated, and is more important than which side at the moment holds possession of a hundred battlefields.

Money Comes Last.

"Men, money and munitions." Of these money is the least important. International bankruptcy all around would have no effect on the war, excepting as it curtailed the power of the entente to buy munitions in America and Japan, and the relative importance, though not the amount, of the manufacturing output of neutral countries is steadily declining as the industrial mobilization of Britain and Russia proceeds. Many good judges think Austria is bankrupt now and Germany will be unable without indemnities to meet her obligations, but these facts, if they are facts, produce little impression in the trenches. So long as a government can persuade or force its own people to accept its paper money, supplying its armies from industrial resources within its own borders and paying for supplies with paper, it can go on fighting as

Krupp has produced several thousand quick-firing 5.9-inch howitzers which have almost entirely superseded, on the vital sectors of the western front, the standard three-inch fieldpiece. To these new guns alone are due such successes as the Germans have recently obtained before Ypres and at Vimy. Meanwhile Skoda in Austria, specializing in heavies, has turned out an incredible number of 12 and 16-inch weapons; at least 126 of these giants were used on a narrow front against the Italians in the Trentino offensive, and more than two hundred have hammered the defenses of Verdun. Great strides have been made recently by British and French gunmakers, and the present victorious Russian attack indicates that Russia, too, has supplied herself or been supplied by her friends with the right kind of guns in plentiful numbers. There is no doubt that given time enough, the arsenal of the world will be able to overhaul the Teutons in artillery production as the munition plants are doing in the shell output, but it is vital to give even approximate figures indicating the present relative positions of the rival powers as regards artillery.

Must Have Men.

There remains the most important problem—that of man power. Men can fight without guns, but without men guns are worthless. For purposes of comparison, the strength of the entente armies will be vaguely discussed, although I may not go into details concerning them, before definite figures on the German army are put forward and explained. Great Britain supplied by voluntary recruitment 5,640,000 men, and to this number must be added a few hundred thousand conscripts who have been called up or will have been by the middle of July. This figure is, however, very misleading when taken to include fighting strength, including as it does the regular army and reserve and territorial establishments at the beginning of the war. Probably nearly a million men must be subtracted to allow for permanent losses sustained and men invalided out of service, the latter an important source of wastage which never appears in the published casualty returns of any country. The real basis for estimating Britain's military strength is Premier Asquith's recent declaration in parliament that Great Britain is maintaining 71 divisions of infantry, as I was able to announce on December 5 last, and that Australia and Canada are keeping up 15 divisions, a total for the empire of 86 divisions. A division at full strength comprises twenty thousand men, but under modern conditions so many of these must be used for support and non-combatant though performed under fire, that but 12,000 to 14,000 bayonets, the exact number depending on conditions and the lines of communication, can be put in the trenches. Assuming the latter figure, the empire is maintaining 1,264,000 available bayonets at home and abroad, in England, Ireland, India, Persia, Mesopotamia, Macedonia, Egypt and East Africa. And it has been officially announced in the commons that no more separate divisions will be raised during the war.

Reserves Sufficient.

Where, then, are England's remaining millions? The answer explains why, though the brunt of the fighting has been borne by others, Britain's allies hope her infantry will turn the scale at the end, and why her enemies, though affecting to sneer, dread her efforts during the concluding phase of the war. Britain has ample reserves to maintain her 86 divisions at full strength for nearly two years, thanks to the foresight of Lord Kitchener, who planned from the beginning, since he could not get at the start improvable armies able to deal with Germany's veterans, to strike the finishing blow of the war. It is true that something like half a million good soldiers, as Winston Churchill's estimate is correct, have been kept in England to guard against possible invasion, and have not been counted upon for foreign service. The fear of invasion is now practically nonexistent since the German fleet steadily departed from the scene of its "victrity" in the North sea and disposed of the widespread legend that it had a new and terrible weapon up its sleeve, but subtracting this half million from these islands' total of 5,640,000 volunteers, deducting a million killed, wounded and sick, adding

a million men as the ultimate effort of the dominions and colonies, and a reasonable allowance for conscripts, it is seen that the British reserves are amply sufficient to insure that Kitchener's plan may be carried out.

The empire has available at present not less than 5,600,000 soldiers at home, abroad and in the colonies.

Position of France.

Discussion concerning the details of French contribution to the answer is frowned upon in Paris, but, roughly, France has put five million men in the field, not counting the boys of 18 and 19 who have not yet completed their training, and her permanent wastage from all sources is generally put at much less than half, or more than a third, that figure. Her casualties have fallen more heavily in proportion upon that younger men, who make the best soldiers, as during the first 18 months of war the older classes, unable to endure trench hardships so well as their juniors, and others have been used from dangerous duties in the rear. Efforts have now been made to check this wastage of the best material. In places where no important events are precipitated, the advanced positions are held by inferior troops, so that the inevitable daily losses fall upon them, while the more vigorous, formed into "shock corps," are held in reserve, and are sent forward only upon important occasions. It was a "shock corps" which hurled back the Germans on the Douaumont plateau in February and saved Verdun, and it is the frequent counterattacks which the French undertake when the ceaseless German assaults menace some position of vital importance.

What Saved Russia.

Amazing misapprehensions have prevailed concerning Russia, and stories about ten million Slavs in arms have misled currency. How many soldiers are there in the Russian army, I do not know, but the surprising fact may now be stated that six months ago the Russian empire was holding four hundred miles of front with eight hundred thousand bayonets, not more than Great Britain had in the field at the time, and with a greatly inferior supply of guns and shells. Russia was saved by the extension of the German armies during the last phases of the great retreat last fall and by the winter. She made prodigious efforts and her friends did their best to help her during the months when her and her resources were at their lowest, and the amazing fruits of that winter of desperate endeavor are now manifest to the stricken armies of Austria. The exact position of Russia as regards equipment and munitions is a subject of speculation in the best-informed quarters, and it is said Lord Kitchener's dilated mission to Russia was an attempt to find out for himself and the French how the Russian really stands. The current estimates vary widely and seem equally untrustworthy. Roughly speaking, the question of Russian man power does not belong in this article, because for all practical purposes it is unlimited. The question with Russia is not how many men she can put in the field, but how many she can afford equip and find guns and shells to support. The officer question is one her most serious difficulties, for the educated class in Russia is far smaller in proportion to the population than elsewhere in Europe, and most of the original officer corps was wiped out during the disasters of last year.

The present position of Germany, as understood by the authorities most competent to judge outside of Germany, the intelligence departments of Germany's enemies, will now be explained in detail.

How Germany Stands.

Germany has put into the field almost exactly nine million soldiers, some three million more than her experts before the war believed possible, and her recruitment is entirely exhausted with the exception of the boys who are growing up to military age. The lists of the class of 1917 (their "class") indicates their twentieth year, when in peace time they would have been conscripted, were warned last December and called out soon after, and will appear soon at the front. The German system allowing for not more than five months' training before the recruit is held fit for the firing line. If the boys of the class of 1918 are not yet 18 years old, and they will be the next to be drafted. About seven hundred thousand boys attain military age every year in Germany, but some of these are unfit and the French headquarters staff figures on the analogy of the French younger classes that exemption among such boys must be much more numerous than among youths of 20 years old, so that Germany can count on only about four hundred thousand soldiers from among her boys now aged 17 years and 6 months to 18 years and 6 months. This estimate is greater than that of the Germans themselves, for a semi-official German statement recently announced that Germany can mobilize thirty thousand recruits monthly from her young classes for as many years as the war may last. This works out at 360,000 a year and sounds impressive, until it is remembered that Germany's permanent wastage on the most conservative allowance possible is four to five times as great as can be made up by the ripening of her green cannon fodder.

Comparisons.

The Kaiser now has in the field 151 infantry divisions, of which 113 are in the west, 36 of these before Verdun and 35 on the British front. Forty-nine divisions are in the east and three were last reported in the Balkans, but probably either the great "action action" on the Meuse has drawn them thither or they have been hurried to Galicia to strengthen their wavering allies. Allowing, as in the British army, 14,000 bayonets to a division, Germany would appear to have 2,114,000 bayonets available for the trenches, with 206,000 men at the front performing other duties, although this is probably a slight overestimate, as all the German divisions are not up to strength. There is much controversy concerning Germany's losses, but the most capable and conservative neutral critics, such as Colonel Peyer of Switzerland, say that the permanent wastage from all sources, including sickness, during the war cannot be less than three million. Accepting this minimum figure, which is 250,000 less than the estimate of the French headquarters staff on May 1, it appears that Germany has not now more than six million soldiers in arms, and is maintaining a half of them in action, while all the remainder are employed in the transport and auxiliary services, and no trained or untrained reserves are left except a limited number of immature boys and men over military age.

Bayonet Percentage.

Every military man who discusses this question hammers home the fact that an amazing feat is performed in keeping one bayonet in the trenches

for every two men, at the front and rear, performing the thousand and one jobs necessary to keep a modern army going. That is what the German army is doing, although the proportion in the British army, Winston Churchill recently told the commons, is three non-combatants to one bayonet. The explanation is the immovable light field railways built by the Germans behind their lines, which save time and labor; they have 12 rear Verdun alone, while the French depend on motor transport. France and Britain did not start building field railways behind their front because they expected to drive the Germans back long before such jobs could be completed. The German staff commenced its railways in the fall of 1914, after it had decided to hold its ground indefinitely in the west and seek a decision over Russia.

The term "reserves" often leads to confusion because when military men use it they mean either of two things. All armies unless in their last stages of collapse, have a local reserve in billets or maintained fresh for use at critical moments. These are "reserves" and of them Germany has many divisions while part of every division is at most a local reserve. In saying Germany has no reserves left, I use the term in its other sense, as meaning that all troops available are at or near the front, and that there are no great central reservoirs at home from which wastage can be made up, such as Britain and Russia possess. This lack of central reserves means that the total fighting strength of the German units must decline from now on—and the allies claim to have evidence that this process has begun—or else that some divisions must be altogether abolished and their survivors used to fill the gaps to keep the other units at full strength.

The great military advantage of Britain over Germany can now be ap-

preciated. Including Dominion forces, Britain has within half a million as many men in the imperial army as present-day Germany, but is using nearly half so many at the front. While all of Germany's 151 divisions are on the fighting line or within immediate call—and the same is true of France and Austria—not nearly all of Britain's 86 divisions are on any front. And since Britain has reserves to keep these 86 divisions at full strength long after the Kaiser's anxiety to win victory of peace in 1915 can well be understood.

Britain is not shirking, as ill-informed critics have it. She created those 86 divisions and the millions in khaki to support them, for use, not ornament, and she intends they shall be there at the finish and strike, with Russia's help, the final blow. It is playing the heavy role now. It would have been possible for Britain, by creating more divisions with fewer reserves, to play a bigger part in the 1916 campaign, but Lord Kitchener planned for a long war, and the scheme of the new armies which is wholly his, is based on the assumption that the maximum result for the efforts put forward can be gained in 1917, or, if necessary, 1918. A famous general recently remarked: "Even if France should disappear, we ourselves can whip Germany on land in two years if Russia can take care of Austria and Turkey." It is hard on France, but it is war, and France, grimly enduring, approves the British plan.

True states by which the German empire has brought its entire man power into play will now be explained. On November 1, 1914, during the battle at Ypres and the first attack on Warsaw, the whole able army had appeared at the front—all men who had served in the army in peace time and who were still of military age, 3,600,000 of them.

During the next three months the


Ernst reserve took the field. It was composed of men who had not served their time, but had received a short training before the war broke. The American militia, and it was given several months' extra work during the summer and autumn before reaching the trenches. After February 1, 1915, no trained men remained, and the work of preparing untrained material for fighting commenced. Unlike France, Germany in peace time trains less than two-thirds of her young men. By April 1, all untrained men between 20 and 35 had been called up, except those retained in indispensable war industries in jobs which could not be filled by women, boys or old men. By August 1, just a year after the war began, all untrained men up to 40 had been made soldiers, although most of them were still retained in training depots at home.

During the latter part of the summer of 1915 the process known as "combing out" began. All men of military age who had been rejected as unfit before or during the war were re-examined, and hundreds of thousands of cripples and defectives of all sorts were passed for military service. These men, of course, had not been sent into battle. The ruthless German military machine has taken every man who can do anything to release a more able comrade for the trenches, and "runfies" are doing work which has made it possible to keep the German divisions up to strength so long. German prisoners tell of one-armed and one-legged men on every German line, in every case performing—such is German organization—tasks for which one arm or one leg is as good as two. This process to some extent is being duplicated in France, but is just beginning in England.

There remains for consideration Germany's use of her young material. In the army that went to the Marne

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